AA
Share
The escalation of military tensions in the Caribbean between the Donald Trump administration and Nicolás Maduro’s dictatorship in Venezuela is unlikely to lead to an invasion—which would require at least a two-year occupation to produce a “regime change”—but could result in bombings and military incidents that “could get out of control,” says Dr. David Smilde, professor of sociology at Tulane University and an expert on Venezuela and its bilateral relations with the United States.
In an interview on the program Esta Semana, broadcast on CONFIDENCIAL’s YouTube channel due to television censorship in Nicaragua, Smilde analyzed the rising tensions between the two countries after the United States destroyed a spee boat, allegedly manned by Venezuelan drug traffickers in the Caribbean, while two Venezuelan F-16s flew over U.S. warships.
Smilde argues that the U.S. military operation contains elements of “political theater,” aimed at creating a war narrative with Venezuela to justify the mass deportation of Venezuelan migrants under the “foreign enemies” act with a country at war.
The Tulane University researcher, author of five books on Venezuela and a specialist in hemispheric studies, explained that Trump’s strategy seeks to create cracks around Nicolás Maduro, but warned that it also carries risks for the Venezuelan opposition: “The most likely outcome is that Maduro will tighten his grip on the opposition, and the only scenario that could benefit them would be a regime change. But the opposition could only occupy Miraflores Palace through an invasion and a one- or two-year occupation force, and Trump is not going to do that.”
Last week, Donald Trump revealed images of a missile strike that destroyed a speedboat in the Caribbean, allegedly carrying 11 crew members and a load of drugs. International reports indicate that the boat had departed from a small Venezuelan town controlled by drug traffickers, San Juan de Unare. What was the objective of this U.S. attack, and what impact has it had on the already tense relations between the two countries?
“It’s a very good question because, first, Venezuela is not one of the main sources of drugs for the United States. Ninety percent of the cocaine that reaches the U.S. comes through the Pacific or the western Caribbean, not Venezuela; much of the cocaine from Venezuela is destined for Europe.
Second, this boat appeared to be headed for Trinidad (Tobago); sometimes it goes to the Dominican Republic, other times it carries cocaine to container ships. So the attack is more like theater, meant to show the U.S. public that action is being taken in the ‘war on drugs’ promised by Donald Trump during his campaign, in which he pledged to use the armed forces against drug cartels. But it doesn’t have a significant impact on the United States.
Those eight U.S. warships in international waters in the Caribbean, along with a nuclear submarine, do not appear to be deployed to stop drug trafficking. Is there a military purpose? On the other hand, Venezuela announces a higher level of militarization than actually exists, in response to a perceived threat from the United States, and now this first attack has occurred.
Yes, it’s true—drugs are being used as a pretext for several things at play. Nobody in South Florida is a fan of Nicolás Maduro, and there are many people whose main issue is Venezuela’s liberation, including several key Republican legislators; Secretary of State Marco Rubio also considers regime change in Venezuela a priority. They are using the drug pretext to pressure Nicolás Maduro, to see if they can create internal cracks in Venezuela, to see if the military might turn against him. I think that is very unlikely. There is a regime change intention, but I don’t think they will invade. If there’s one thing Trump has been consistent about over the years, it’s that he doesn’t like ‘boots on the ground’ invasions—but he does like bombings. We saw it in Iran; in his first administration, he bombed Syria and Somalia. They are trying all these intimidation tactics, and that’s ongoing.
The other issue is that Trump is tying this to the idea of the Cartel of the Suns and the Tren de Aragua being controlled by Nicolás Maduro, and he is also targeting Venezuelan immigrants in the United States. When he sent 250 Venezuelans to the Cecot in El Salvador, he did so using the ‘Foreign Enemies Act,’ which allows the deportation of people from a country with which the U.S. is at war, without trial or due process. That action was blocked by the Supreme Court, sent to the Federal Court of Appeals, which this week also ruled that Trump cannot do it, because there is no evidence of a military conflict with Venezuela. Now it’s headed back to the Supreme Court. And coincidentally, we have U.S. warships off the coast of Venezuela, and we already have a missile strike on a speedboat. Venezuela sent F-16s to fly over the ships, so if there is a conflict or exchange of fire, it could help the Trump administration in the Supreme Court to declare Venezuela an enemy and argue that Trump is at war with the country, allowing him to use the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelans. That’s also at stake.
What about the claims linking Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello directly to the so-called Cartel of the Suns and the Tren de Aragua? Are these drug trafficking or organized crime groups, and what is their actual impact on drug trafficking to the United States?
In terms of U.S. drug trafficking, they could have an indirect role by allowing it. For example, in the 2020 court case, there is evidence that Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello were aware of drug shipments, and it has long been known that parts of the Armed Forces are involved. But as for the so-called Cartel of the Suns, there is no evidence it exists. That name was invented 30 years ago by journalists to indicate military involvement in drug trafficking (the ‘suns’ refer to the insignias worn on military uniforms). Today, it’s often treated as official, but there is no actual Cartel of the Suns.
The Tren de Aragua does exist; it is a criminal group operating in Venezuela, but Nicolás Maduro does not control it, and it is not connected to anything called the Cartel of the Suns. The Tren de Aragua also has no history of maritime operations—they do not operate speedboats.
It was claimed that the people on that boat were from the Tren de Aragua, but there is no evidence. It would be a huge surprise if there were, because there are no known cases of the Tren de Aragua operating at sea.
There are bits of truth—some facts woven into a much broader narrative to portray Nicolás Maduro as being in charge of all of this, creating an image of conflict. But the problem is that Maduro is so discredited, so delegitimized—for good reasons, having stolen last year’s elections—that anything can be believed; it’s hard to say that the most outlandish claim is false.
Many of the questions that currently have no answers could probably have been clarified if the U.S. had detained this speedboat and discovered who its crew were, and their links to drug trafficking. But what the United States did was not an anti-narcotics operation—they simply fired a missile and the boat disappeared, and now nobody knows what the evidence is. Is this atypical behavior for U.S. anti-narcotics forces, or does it have another objective?
It’s the first time something like this has happened. Previously, for interdicting this type of speedboat, they would use a drone, or a sniper to disable the engines, board the boat, inspect it, and arrest the crew if necessary. But this premeditated action—without warning—of blowing up a boat with a missile is unprecedented; it is an act of war.
All the rhetoric they use is that these aren’t just traffickers—they’re “narco-terrorists,” and this is a war on terrorism. What we’re seeing with the Trump administration is that increasingly political and law enforcement matters are being framed in military terms. This isn’t happening only internationally; domestically, he sent the National Guard to Washington to curb crime, and deployed them to Los Angeles where there were protests.
For the executive branch, it’s always appealing—much easier to operate in military terms than in political or law enforcement terms. In different parts of the region, like Ecuador, they are embracing the same idea of narco-terrorism and using the armed forces to respond, because it’s much easier than proceeding politically or through the law.
You mentioned that the United States is playing the card of pressuring for a regime change in Venezuela, which obviously has a political objective. How does this affect the Venezuelan opposition? Is the Venezuelan opposition part of this U.S. strategy?
The opposition in Venezuela is very diverse, but María Corina Machado’s opposition, which is the largest faction, is aligned with this strategy; it is actually the source of it. In 2024, when Nicolás Maduro stole the elections, they basically said they would not participate in elections and would instead seek international intervention. María Corina Machado and members of her coalition, who are in the United States in various locations, have been talking to policymakers about this issue, claiming that Nicolás Maduro is the head of the Cartel of the Suns and that its operational arm is the Tren de Aragua, which is now allegedly operating in the U.S., making it a national security issue. Therefore, the U.S. has to eliminate the source.
This is a classic attempt to seek international intervention when a problem cannot be resolved domestically. What has happened in the United States, however, is that this narrative has been instrumentalized for another purpose by Donald Trump. He is using it against immigrants, and it works very well for him. I don’t think that was the intention of María Corina and her group, but that is how it is being used. In this case, I believe it will backfire for Venezuelans as well.
How do you see the medium-term trajectory of tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela? Rubio and Trump insisted that this is just the beginning and that attacks will continue. Could this lead to military incidents between the two countries?
Maduro is already tightening internal repression; there are more arrests inside Venezuela in a very difficult context. But when you have armed forces in front of a country’s coast, it’s very easy for some type of conflict to occur. I don’t think an invasion is possible, but an altercation, an exchange of fire, or a missile attack could happen. What we saw with this speedboat was a bit like a test balloon to see the reaction. The reaction was condemnation, but it was not very strong regionally or internationally, so I think it gives license to escalate further.
Venezuela flew F-16s over a U.S. warship—this was also a provocative act. Something could happen on either side. I don’t think it will escalate to an invasion because Trump has been consistent on that point. But there could be some kind of conflict, and if that happens, it would actually benefit the Trump administration, because it could help them win in the Supreme Court the right to use the Alien Enemies Act against Venezuelan immigrants. The U.S. intention is intimidation; a small exchange could occur, but as with war, there is always a strong possibility that events could spiral out of control.
How do you see the future of the Venezuelan opposition in this crisis, when they are practically at the mercy of Donald Trump’s decisions?
It doesn’t look good, because Maduro is likely to tighten his grip on the opposition. The only scenario that could benefit them would be a regime change, but the only way the opposition could occupy Miraflores would be through an invasion and a one- or two-year occupation. The opposition is mainly outside the country; for external reasons, they have been forced to operate from abroad. There is no organized opposition inside Venezuela ready and willing to take power as there was five or ten years ago.
So sending bombers to Caracas or a military base is not going to have much effect; it would be similar to what happened in Iran, which is Trump’s style. I believe the opposition would be worse off under such actions. The only way for them to gain control would be through a long-term occupation to reorganize the country, and that is not going to happen—Trump is not going to do that.
