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For former guerrilla commander Dora María Téllez, the illegal arrest and rushed conviction of retired General Álvaro Baltodano—once one of Daniel Ortega’s closest political and economic allies—represents more than just a political purge. It’s proof, she says, that in today’s power structure, loyalty no longer pays.
“Being loyal to Daniel Ortega—or even to Rosario Murillo—no longer comes with any reward,” the historian said in an interview on Esta Semana, broadcast on CONFIDENCIAL’s YouTube channel.
Baltodano wasn’t just any official. He was part of Daniel Ortega’s “inner, iron circle.” His downfall sends a clear message to the Sandinista leadership: “Anyone who isn’t part of the Ortega-Murillo family will end up in ‘El Chipote’ or ‘La Modelo,’ accused of anything,” warned the exiled and denationalized political prisoner Dora María Téllez.
According to her analysis, the silence surrounding the arrests of prominent Sandinista figures can be explained by one simple reason: fear. A fear that reaches from the mid-level ranks of the FSLN all the way to the top of the military, where figures like General Julio César Avilés could be “in line” to fall next.
On Monday, June 9, 2025, retired General Álvaro Baltodano was sentenced to 20 years in prison in a secret trial held inside the prison. Does this have any impact on the leadership of the Sandinista Front and the Nicaraguan Army?
I think it does, because the message is crystal clear: loyalty no longer pays off. Being loyal to Daniel Ortega, even to Rosario Murillo, no longer brings any reward. Years ago, loyalty paid off, but not anymore. Baltodano was part of Ortega’s innermost, iron circle, just like (Alberto) Acuña, Ortega’s head of security. The message is very clear: anyone who isn’t part of the Ortega-Murillo family will end up in El Chipote or La Modelo, accused of whatever, because the paranoia within the Ortega-Murillo circle keeps growing.
Baltodano was captured in the early hours of May 14 on his estate by a contingent of officers from the Judicial Support Directorate. Now, less than a month later, he’s been sentenced in a video-conference trial held inside prison. Is this a sign that the regime is radicalizing?
I think it’s a total sign of weakness, actually. If they’ve started to devour their own inner circle, then the military leadership is next. I believe General Julio César Avilés could be in line—he’s been the head of the army for 15 years and has accumulated a lot of power. The same goes for the two colonel-generals (Bayardo Rodríguez and Marvin Corrales); my impression is that naming them “colonel-generals” is just a way to start clearing them out. These are people who’ve gained a lot of power—and anyone who accumulates too much power or too much information is not to Rosario Murillo’s liking. I think the military leadership is clearly next. And they’ve likely already been warned.
Baltodano was convicted of the alleged crime of treason, with political motives attributed to his arrest. Following his detention, other former military officers were also captured, though their status remains unknown. Former council members and mayors from the CxL party were detained as well. Does this point to signs of discontent among Sandinistas with Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo?
I believe so. Within the Sandinista Front, there is growing discontent, which is becoming more widespread. At the same time, the party’s base is significantly eroding. Among the mid-level ranks, there’s a sense that they could be imprisoned at any moment—just like dozens of government and party officials who are still being held at “El Chipote” under conditions of enforced disappearance. No one knows anything about them, and their families stay silent out of fear for their own safety.
The Sandinista leadership is bound together by corruption, but below that level, people are afraid the rug could be pulled out from under them at any time. They know they could be dismissed, stripped of everything, or end up in prison—something that has already happened repeatedly over the past two years. As the regime feels increasingly weakened, this process of cannibalizing itself will only accelerate. They’re devouring their own ranks, their own circle, and in the end, the only ones left will be the Ortega-Murillo family and a small inner circle—whose identities are largely unknown—because even their most loyal followers are now falling out of favor.
Silence over Álvaro Baltodano’s Conviction
Still, there’s an eerie silence within the Sandinista Front. The government hasn’t said a word about Baltodano’s arrest, and neither have Sandinista officials or former military officers. Why so much silence?
Out of fear. That’s the regime’s fear. They know perfectly well that disappearing and kidnapping Álvaro Baltodano, and now putting him on trial in one of those ultra-fast videoconference hearings carried out by judicial henchmen, is not well received—neither within the Army nor inside the Sandinista Front, where Baltodano had a certain level of prestige and recognition. The same goes for former military officers, who see Baltodano as one of their own. And the same within the government circles—Baltodano held important positions in the administration and played a role in promoting alliances between Ortega and the Sandinista Front.
So this arrest has an impact, and they know it. That’s why they’re trying to keep it hidden. They rushed through this trial to send a message and are trying to keep the information tightly controlled, but that’s impossible. The charge of “treason” is the regime’s go-to weapon—they’ll keep using it because it’s the easiest. It’s not provable, it’s subjective, and for the judges, it’s easy to apply. Just one accusation of treason to the homeland, and they can hand you 20 years, seize your assets, and that’s it.
Does this purge of Álvaro Baltodano, once a close ally of Daniel Ortega, signal the consolidation of Rosario Murillo’s dynastic succession within the ruling inner circle?
I believe it does. There are three important signs pointing in that direction. First, the arrest of Jorge “El Cuervo” Guerrero, which then quietly faded, he was likely released. Then, the disgraceful dismissal, arrest, and asset seizure of General Commissioner Acuña, who was Ortega’s head of security. And now the case of Baltodano, also part of Ortega’s inner circle. The fact that Daniel Ortega was unable to block these outcomes because they could have been sanctioned or removed in other ways; there are countless ways to deal with internal conflicts, speaks volumes. But Rosario Murillo’s way is to get rid of them completely and destroy them entirely. That, without a doubt, shows Ortega’s inability to veto some of the repressive actions that Rosario Murillo carries out.
In 2024, Humberto Ortega, former army chief and brother of Daniel Ortega, died as a political prisoner.
In that case, I think Daniel was fully on board with the decision. He was upset, believing Humberto had betrayed him by making a photo of them public. I clearly see Daniel’s hand in that. But in the cases of Acuña and Baltodano, I believe these are Rosario Murillo’s decisions—removing people she sees as inconvenient, who don’t support her, or who perhaps said something negative about her. For Rosario Murillo, even the slightest comment becomes a massive threat and triggers harsh revenge and retaliation.
The situation in the Nicaraguan Army
You mentioned General Avilés, who has held the position of army chief for over 15 years, and the promotion of two members of the General Staff who are now general colonels. Along with 25 other generals, they form a bottleneck that blocks the promotion of more than 100 colonels within the institution. Is the military aligned and subordinated to Rosario Murillo’s leadership, or does Daniel Ortega still retain control over the army?
Daniel Ortega still retains leadership over the army, at least politically, and that’s exactly what Rosario Murillo lacks. Humberto Ortega pointed this out very clearly, which is why they first confined him to house arrest and then sent him to a hospital to die.
This is an army that has been brought to its knees by Avilés. And now, being brought to its knees also means bowing to Rosario Murillo, who is forcing them to submit to her. Avilés knows this full well, as do the two general colonels, and they know Murillo is coming for them. Her style is to take down any leadership that doesn’t owe their position exclusively to her. It’s only a matter of time before she picks her own successor and gets rid of all three of them. These three—Avilés and the two colonels—are the main obstacle in the military and are primarily responsible for the army’s subservience to a dictatorial family. This group of generals is also blocking the army’s development as an institution. Because the Ortega-Murillo regime is a dictatorship that destroys institutional life in everything it touches.
With Álvaro Baltodano’s case, there are now more than 20 political prisoners held in conditions of enforced disappearance, including some ex-military officials and politicians from the CxL party. International organizations cannot access Nicaraguan prisons. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been expelled. The UN says the government does not respond to its requests, and even less so to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Will the prisons remain closed?
No doubt about it. The tendency has been for the Ortega-Murillo government, this two-headed dictatorship, to withdraw from all international organizations, from the Human Rights Councils, from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, from the ILO, from the WHO, from UNESCO. And now it has just withdrawn from the UNHCR, which deals with refugees.
You have a dictatorship that is isolating itself more and more. That’s a sign of weakness, not strength. A strong dictatorship keeps up its international ties—but here, they’ve completely sealed themselves off, as if that could shield them from global scrutiny. But it won’t. The UN still has a Group of Human Rights Experts (GHREN) conducting deep investigations, and their latest report revealed critical information clearly sourced from within the Nicaraguan Army. That scrutiny will continue, whether they like it or not.
They keep the prisons closed because, in some twisted way, the Ortega-Murillo family takes pleasure in the suffering—not only of the prisoners themselves, but also of their families. Isolation, enforced disappearance, the denial of family visits, poor nutrition, lack of information, and constant threats to relatives of political prisoners—this is all part of the torture the Ortega-Murillo regime inflicts. It targets political opponents, people who were caught up by sheer chance, those accused of corruption, and even their own allies who are now imprisoned for supposedly straying from the line. Others, like Carlos Fonseca Jr. and Henry Ruiz, have been condemned to a kind of house arrest, forced to live as conscripts in their own homes. This is a dictatorship with deep internal weakness—one that tries to compensate for that weakness through repression, brute force, and torture.
