AA
Share
The new General Law on Convergent Telecommunications in Nicaragua formally takes effect on November 6, 2025 — one year after its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta. Law 1223, or the “new gag law,” puts the security and privacy of telecommunications and the internet at risk under the dual dictatorship of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo.
At CONFIDENCIAL, we analyze the changes and dangers introduced by this legislation, the new role of the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services (TELCOR), and the new obligations and risks it poses for consumers and internet users, operators and service providers, content producers, and importers.
To justify the new law, the regime claimed it was necessary to modernize the regulatory framework, since the previous legislation dated back to 1995. But Law 1223 hides a political objective: to establish a superstructure of absolute control over the telecommunications sector and internet in Nicaragua.
The law was passed by the regime’s rubber-stamp National Assembly in October 2024 and published a few days later in La Gaceta. Its real purpose, however, stems from the regime’s efforts to control social media following the civic protests that erupted in the country in April 2018.
The result is the subordination of telecommunications infrastructure, digital content, and user privacy to the dictatorship’s totalitarian control. Legal and telecommunications experts have warned that the new law turns technical regulation into a political weapon under Nicaragua’s de facto police state.
User privacy at risk
The law has a direct and severe impact on the digital rights and privacy of users of telecommunications services.
Article 110 of the “new gag law” requires public service operators and audiovisual providers to supply TELCOR with georeferenced and statistical information, enabling the state to implement mass surveillance systems. This obligation includes the potential to monitor communications such as calls, text messages, or emails, as well as online activities like web browsing and mobile app usage.
A 2024 analysis by the Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy warned that collecting and analyzing this information — including communication metadata such as duration, location, and time — allows the creation of detailed profiles of individuals or groups to identify behavioral patterns and potential dissent. This is considered one of the most serious threats in a context where freedoms are restricted.
The law affirms the right to the inviolability of communications and associated data, but nullifies it at the request of authorities, leaving privacy at the mercy of state discretion.
Content creators and media under scrutiny
Internet content creators and independent media are exposed under the new telecommunications law.
The law defines “content” on the internet as any information generated in any form of expression and distributed electronically. Experts consider this definition to be disconnected from the technological framework that a telecommunications law should regulate.
The risk is heightened by the Special Cybercrime Law (Law 1042), passed by the dictatorship in October 2020 and dubbed the first “gag law.” Its ambiguous language on the dissemination of “false and/or distorted information” immediately made it a tool for political repression. Since its enactment, the law has been systematically used to criminalize and prosecute opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders, serving as the legal basis for arbitrary charges that have imprisoned numerous political prisoners.
In September 2024, the National Assembly amended the Special Cybercrime Law to increase the prison term for cybercrimes against “state security” from 10 to 15 years. According to the reform, these crimes are punishable even if committed outside the country by individuals or legal entities.
Another aspect of the “new gag law” is that it requires local channels and audiovisual creators operating online to obtain a license from TELCOR in order to function.
This requirement is seen as a political mechanism designed to exclude any actor who dissents or does not align with the regime. As a result, there are fears that these restrictions could lead to a de facto digital blockade of independent media operating from exile.
Paradoxically, the law considers it a serious offense to block content and applications without prior authorization from TELCOR, cementing the state’s absolute control over what may or may not circulate.
Operators and providers under state co-optation
Public Telecommunications Service Operators and Audiovisual Service Providers constitute critical infrastructure subject to state surveillance and co-optation. Both are required to obtain a license from TELCOR and are subject to exhaustive regulatory and technical control.
Audiovisual service providers include broadcast and subscription television, radio, and any other service that distributes audiovisual content by any means, including the internet.
The law obliges them to join national radio and television broadcasts when TELCOR calls, particularly in emergencies or when messages of “national interest” are transmitted. It also requires them to make their facilities and services available to the government free of charge in emergency situations.
Essentially, TELCOR will co-opt private communication infrastructure to ensure the continuous flow of information that favors the state, while simultaneously repressing any independent or critical information flow.
According to official figures, Nicaragua has 7.5 million cellular lines, of which the telecom company Claro controls 50.43% and Tigo 49.57%.
TELCOR: The Regime’s Tool of Control
TELCOR emerges in the new law as the central actor, with unprecedented power and a dangerous centralization. The regulatory body is headed by Nahima Janett Díaz Flores, daughter of Police Chief Francisco Díaz — who is Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo’s co–father-in-law. She has been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union since January 2022.
Under the pretext of planning and developing the sector, TELCOR is granted broad and discretionary powers that directly threaten digital rights and freedom of expression in a context of ongoing violations of public liberties.
Through TELCOR, the law consolidates government control over telecommunications, giving it authority to set standards, regulate, plan, supervise, and oversee the sector.
The danger — according to experts — is that ambiguities and gaps in its definitions facilitate arbitrary enforcement of the law.
Additionally, the legislation allows TELCOR to enlist public security forces to carry out inspections, audits, or the removal of equipment for alleged “national security” reasons or regulatory noncompliance.
TELCOR also has the power to intervene in private company operations, impose sanctions, or revoke licenses based on broad or loosely defined criteria. It may even restrict or prohibit the import and use of equipment that, in the regime’s judgment, poses a threat to national security.
The law further allows TELCOR to issue all subsequent regulations necessary for the law’s implementation without approval from the National Assembly. This leaves the definition of many details to the regulator’s discretion, including licensing costs and content regulation.
Requirements for manufacturers and importers
Manufacturers and importers of telecommunications equipment are also subject to strict control over the hardware entering the country.
The manufacture, import, distribution, and sale of equipment require prior approval from TELCOR.
According to the law, the purpose is to ensure that the equipment’s technical specifications will not harm networks and to guarantee user safety.
In practice, TELCOR may restrict or prohibit the import and use of equipment that, in its judgment, poses a threat to national security.
In November 2024, the dictatorship issued a circular requiring Nicaraguan ministries and state institutions to prioritize information and communication technology (ICT) manufacturers from China in public tenders. “All public sector entities and agencies must prioritize the acquisition of ICT solutions whose manufacturer’s country of origin is the People’s Republic of China,” stated Administrative Circular DGCE-SP-10-2024, signed by the State General Director of Procurement, Nasser Silwany González.
Surveillance of communications in Nicaragua
The new law follows a history of communication surveillance by the dictatorship. In August 2024, a CONFIDENCIAL investigation revealed that a Nicaraguan Army base in Cerro Mokorón, south of Managua, has become one of Russia’s main espionage centers, according to sources linked to the military. The report, titled “Russian espionage center operates at Mokorón military base in Managua,” detailed that Russian officials are the only ones controlling and handling the equipment and information obtained, while Nicaraguan officers are limited to providing “security” at the base, according to sources with access to the military facility.
Russian antennas and espionage equipment were installed at several Nicaraguan military bases in mid-2017. Since then, the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence has processed the information gathered using a radiogoniometry system, which geolocates phone, television, and radio signals generated across the radio spectrum. This is purportedly part of a national defense strategy.
The radiogoniometry system has eight points across the country, located in Chinandega, Nueva Segovia, Chontales, Rivas, the North Caribbean Coast, and near the borders with Honduras and Costa Rica.
The investigation revealed that the Russians added SORM-3 software to this system, which monitors the activities of alleged subversive groups, drug trafficking networks, and neighboring armies, enabling the dictatorship to spy on and intercept communications of its “targets” as well as so-called “internal enemies.”
Fake cell towers for interception
Earlier, in October 2022, an analysis published by CONFIDENCIAL also revealed the existence of 39 fake antennas monitoring cell phones in Nicaragua. The study, conducted by South Lighthouse —an organization dedicated to investigating technologies for human rights— and the Fake Antenna Detection Project (FADe Project), documented irregularities in antennas in Managua, Matagalpa, Jinotega, and Estelí. These antennas can capture information from citizens’ cell phones using IMSI-Catcher devices, which are used for electronic surveillance.
CONFIDENCIAL consulted cybersecurity experts on how to prevent phones from being intercepted by these “fake antennas” in Nicaragua. One specialist explained that the main challenge is that phones do not notify users when they switch from one antenna to another, meaning any citizen can fall within the coverage of an IMSI-Catcher without realizing it.
China’s entry into the cellular market
China’s presence in the sector has also strengthened in recent years. In July 2025, it was reported that Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group Co. Ltd., a Chinese company,
The projects include the construction of an LTE (Long Term Evolution) network with 190 wireless base stations to cover the municipalities of Managua and Ciudad Sandino, according to the first contract.
The second contract envisions a less dense network, with 276 stations located across various departments in the Pacific, central, and northern regions of the country, according to a roughly sketched map included in the document.
In an interview on the pro-regime Canal 8 on November 4, 2025, TELCOR Director General Nahima Díaz confirmed that Nicaragua will soon have a new mobile operator, although she did not provide a specific date.
Díaz highlighted that the Convergent Telecommunications Law will allow for number portability, enabling people to keep their phone number even when switching operators.
However, she clarified that the change will not happen automatically under the new law. “Administrative, technical, and legal issues with the operators need to be addressed. We already have progress with the operators, who are very collaborative,” she said, noting that they are preparing part of their budgets.
