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The premise of this article is that every transition is not an event but a process, understanding a process as an articulation of events that leads to the fulfillment of a new historical phase. Indeed, history, far from being determined by laws, follows courses conditioned by the articulation of events that lead to processes that determine themselves and, only after they occur, can be divided into phases or episodes.
Based on that premise, we can say that in Venezuela—and perhaps in countries where autocracies also prevail, such as Cuba and Nicaragua—an externally induced process has begun which, eventually, and only if certain conditions are met, could lead, if not to democratization, at least to the formation of non-autocratic republics.
I say externally induced because the determining factor has been, and will remain for some time, the Trump administration, which, following the 2025 National Security Strategy to the letter, seeks to ensure hemispheric dominance in countries at risk of being economically, politically, or militarily occupied by one or both rival empires: Russia and China.
I can therefore say, without fear of being mistaken, that the new world order will also be a neo-imperial order, and the three countries mentioned are pieces on the board of a new division of the world.
We must keep in mind that the Trump administration is not interested in eliminating dictatorships, nor in establishing democracies. It is more interested in taking control of the strategic resources of the nations it integrates into its orbit of domination and thus preventing, in “its” hemisphere, the entry of Chinese capital or Russian military agents. It has achieved this in the three dictatorships mentioned.
In Cuba, Trump will have to secure his dominance, though he does not yet know how. In Nicaragua, Ortega and Murillo are so opportunistic that no one would be surprised if they declared themselves pro-USA overnight. In Venezuela, Trump has achieved something more: exercising economic and political tutelage through the neo-Chavista government of Delcy Rodríguez.
In Cuba and Nicaragua, there are no signs of democratic transition. In Venezuela, by contrast, there are. Venezuela is—or has become—the weakest link in the Latin American dictatorial chain. That is why many observers, Venezuelan and otherwise, write about the beginning of a transition from dictatorship to democracy. My opinion, however, is not (yet) so optimistic.
Rupture and opening in Venezuela
In Venezuela, there are reasons to think that a transition is near, but also reasons to think that the process, if it takes place, will be very difficult. For now, my thesis is: In Venezuela, the transition from dictatorship to democracy is blocked by factors that are more internal than external. This thesis must be substantiated.
In Venezuela there has been—and still is—an internal rupture within the regime that has led toward a political opening. Others, with good reason, think the opposite: that it has been the political opening, due to the “extraction” of the dictator, that has led to the rupture of the Maduro regime. Historians will later determine which of these realities is correct. The former seems more likely to the author of these lines. Trump acted knowing that at the top of the PSUV there was, if not a rupture, at least a fracture.
As I write, Cardinal Porras has confirmed that the United States offered Maduro the possibility of leaving the country, which the dictator rejected. This suggests that the US maintained contact not only with Maduro but with the regime’s top leadership. What was at stake at that moment—and as the Rodríguez siblings and probably Diosdado Cabello understood—was the historical survival of Chavismo. Handing over Maduro was the only way to avoid a massive US invasion under the pretext of a war against narcoterrorism.
Surely, for the more hardline Maduro faction, the alternative embraced by the Rodríguez faction was seen as betrayal. That is also the thesis of the main party supporting Maria Corina Machado, VENTE. One of its leaders, Omar Gonzalez Moreno, stated—significantly on Good Friday—that Delcy Rodriguez was a Judas, echoing a phrase previously used by the pro-Putin philosopher Aleksandr Dugin.
But let us focus on the essential: there is indeed a rupture in Venezuela. Now, between rupture and opening there is an obvious relationship. Within Chavismo there is a break with Maduro and “Madurismo,” and the possibility of a “Delcismo” is emerging which, as I have argued elsewhere, would represent the third phase of Chavismo (the first two being Chavez’s Chavismo and Madurismo).
Chavez was an extremely authoritarian populist, but not a dictator in the classical sense. Maduro, especially after the electoral fraud of July 28, became a classic dictator—worse still: without popular support, despised even by leftist governments, and supported only by low-profile European politicians such as Monedero, Iglesias, Ramonet, and by dictators like Diaz-Canel, Ortega, Kim Jong Un, the ayatollahs, and Putin.
Delcy Rodríguez, then, is playing a triple role: savior of the original Chavismo “betrayed” by Maduro, representative of US geostrategic interests, and initiator of an opening that could eventually lead to a political transition. To these three roles, Trump has added a fourth: guarantor of political stability. That is no small matter.
To fulfill these roles, Rodríguez needed to break with Madurismo. That rupture could only be consolidated through a regime opening, which would, of course, be supported by Trump. This opening has already been largely carried out with the release of many political prisoners and a reduction in repression. Economic opening is still pending and will not be easy due to the severe inflation affecting the country. But it will come, and thanks to improved revenues, Rodríguez hopes to become the leader of a third, less dictatorial and more socially oriented Chavismo. Trump hopes for the same. That is why Trump places his hopes in Rodríguez and not in Machado. The reason is simple: Rodriguez currently guarantees political stability; Machado does not. Clarification is necessary here. Trump is not a democrat, but he is a “realpolitiker” in the Kissinger sense of the term.
Stability according to Trump
According to Kissinger, there are two determining principles in national and international politics: internal stability and external balance. Put differently: the balance of nations can only be guaranteed through stability. If that stability is ensured by a democracy, all the better. If it is ensured by a dictatorship, it must be accepted. This means that neither Trump, nor Rubio, nor anyone else is interested in destabilizing Venezuela in pursuit of an unlikely democracy. That is why Trump does not support María Corina Machado but does support Delcy Rodriguez.
Marco Rubio likely seeks to reassure Machado by saying her time will come. However, Trump has already suggested that, if not Rodriguez, he would prefer to support a centrist candidate rather than Maria Corina Machado. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why Trump invited one of Venezuela’s most centrist, democratic, and constitutionalist politicians, Enrique Marquez, to his annual address ceremony. This means that while Machado is pro-Trump, Trump is not pro-Machado. He believes that only a non-polarized option can help ensure Venezuela’s stability. That is simply how things stand.
Lessons from history
The relationship between rupture and opening seen in Venezuela today is not exceptional. On the contrary, it has appeared in most countries that have undergone democratic transitions. It is therefore useful to look at other historical democratization processes around the world.
One of the most classic transitions occurred in South Africa when President F. W. de Klerk, a defender of apartheid, realized in 1989 that the only way to overcome violence and isolation was to free Nelson Mandela and other anti-apartheid leaders. Breaking with racism within his own party, de Klerk released Mandela and initiated dialogue. Mandela, in turn, distanced himself from militant tendencies within his movement. This double rupture led to political opening, fulfilling the three conditions for transition: rupture, opening, and bridge-building between government and opposition.
A similar transition occurred in Spain. There, the first rupture was biological: the death of Franco in 1975. The transition truly began with Adolfo Suarez, who broke with the old regime by promoting political reform, legalizing opposition parties, and building bridges with both the monarchy and the Socialist Party. This led to the 1978 Constitution.
The transition began with Adolfo Suárez, a representative of the modernizing economic wing of Francoism, who broke with its more entrenched, archaic form by promoting the Political Reform Law, approved in the 1976 referendum. Opposition parties were legalized, including the communists. It was at that point that Suárez built two bridges: one with the monarchy and another with Felipe González’s PSOE, backed by the wider European social democratic movement. From that joint effort emerged the 1978 Constitution, which remains in force today.
In Spain, in short, there was a rupture within the ruling bloc, followed by a political opening and, finally, a bridge between the post-Franco government and the democratic opposition, in pursuit of the country’s democratization. Something similar would happen in Poland.
Among the transitions that have led to democracy, one can never overlook that of Poland, the most prototypical of those that brought an end to the six dictatorships of the communist world. In Poland, moreover, unlike the other “people’s democracies,” there was a consolidated opposition thanks to two historical forces: the politically organized movement known as Solidarity and the Catholic Church.
The decisive rupture came from the outside, thanks to the emergence of Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the deep economic crisis prevailing in Poland. The last communist attempt to survive had been the imposition of Martial Law in 1981. It was at that time that two options emerged within Solidarity: one advocating confrontational struggle against the communist dictatorship, and the other represented by Lech Wałęsa, who sought to build a bridge between government and opposition. Ultimately, faced with their inability to govern, the communists opened a dialoguing wing, as Wałęsa had hoped. Thus, in 1989 Solidarity was legalized. That same year, parliamentary elections were held in which Solidarity achieved an overwhelming majority. In the presidential elections, Wałęsa stepped aside, supporting the conservative Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the 1989-1990 presidential elections. That victory opened the way to the peaceful overthrow of the European communist dictatorships, including that of the USSR. Shortly afterward, Wałęsa himself would be elected president of the nation.
In summary, Poland’s democratization was the result of three ruptures: the external one led by Gorbachev, Wałęsa’s break with the more extreme factions of Solidarity, and the rupture within the communist party itself. The opening occurred in parallel with the bridge Wałęsa sought to build with factions of the communist regime.
In Latin America, the most classic transition has undoubtedly been the one that led to the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile. There is unanimous agreement on this. There is also agreement that the decisive event of that transition was the victory of the “NO” in the 1988 plebiscite. However, to achieve that victory it was necessary to build a bridge among the different non-Pinochet political parties.
The result of the plebiscite caused a fracture within the military government. Pinochet submitted the continuation of the regime to the discretion of the governing junta but was stopped by the constitutionalist stance of the Air Force commander-in-chief, General Fernando Matthei. Without military unanimity, Pinochet’s days in power were numbered. The constitutional elections of 1989 were made possible thanks to the link established between the military government and the opposition as a whole.
In the presidential elections, the Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin won by a wide margin, although the true leader of the campaign for the “NO” had been Ricardo Lagos. But, like Wałęsa, the socialist Lagos knew how to step aside to facilitate agreements and negotiations between the government and representatives of the former dictatorship.
In this very brief tour through some notable processes of democratization, we have observed a constant. In all cases, though not always in the same order, there has been a dialectic among three elements: rupture of the regime, political opening, and the construction of a bridge between the opposition and reformist sectors of the dictatorship. However, this triad is precisely what we do not observe in the potential processes of democratization that could take place in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Neither in Cuba nor in Nicaragua has there been, despite intense external pressure, a visible rupture within the dictatorial regimes. Not so in the case of Venezuela, where the presence of Delcy Rodriguez in government has marked a profound and probably irreversible break with Maduro’s dictatorial past.
In the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua, there are signs of possible concessions to the United States, but not a significant rupture within either system of domination. Hence, we could say that, of the three countries, Venezuela is the one closest to a transition from dictatorship to democracy. Nevertheless, as in the previous examples, Venezuela still lacks the decisive phase, which can only occur through the construction of a bridge between sectors of the government and sectors of the opposition with the aim of generating a transition.
Naturally, the government of Delcy Rodríguez will do everything possible to remain in power, counting on US support. With such an ally, linking up with the opposition—or part of it—may not seem essential to some leaders of neo-Chavismo. They likely hope that, thanks to economic and social reforms, Rodríguez will recover the political capital that Maduro squandered. At the very least, they will try. Moreover, with which opposition would it be possible to engage in dialogue?
The bridge that could eventually lead to democracy requires actors. One would be Rodriguez’s government. The other, based on the majority obtained on July 28, would be the opposition led by María Corina Machado. But the problem is that the opposition led by this messianic figure is not interested in building a bridge with the government in search of a transition to democracy. Quite the opposite: if there is anything that opposition is interested in, it is defeating the Rodriguez government as soon as possible, whether through elections or by any other means that do not involve a transitional path. The project of Machado’s movement is to topple the neo-Chavista government, blow up the bridges, and initiate a non-negotiated transition process.
One need only read the proclamations issued on social media by political figures such as Juan Pablo Guanipa, Andres Velasquez, or Omar Gonzalez. They are subversive, insurrectional, and confrontational, the opposite of someone seeking to build a bridge to accelerate a democratic transition. Indeed, this extreme opposition led by Machado is, at the same time, exactly what Chavismo needs to remain in power, even in Trump’s eyes. For that opposition—self-described as “the real one”—the motto seems to be: before transitioning, one must overthrow. Afterward, we will impose our conditions.
To put it more directly: at present there is a polarization between neo-Chavismo and Machadismo. Between these poles lies a vacuum where remnants of a centrist and democratic opposition survive, unable to organize themselves. That opposition exists, but only in a potential state.
However, only the formation of a centrist and democratic opposition could allow Venezuela to cross a bridge with the new Chavista-Trumpist government. For now, that possibility is blocked by forces that are extremely irreconcilable with one another.
The problem is serious: up to now, never in history—neither Venezuelan, nor Latin American, nor global—has democratization emerged as the result of political polarization. That is the problem.
*This article was originally published in Polis.
