26 de June 2026
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As part of that oversight, the White House has imposed a transition strategy built around a gradual and flexible three-stage roadmap: stabilization, recovery, and transition. Within this framework, democratization has been subordinated first to achieving internal political control and advancing US geopolitical objectives, and later to economic recovery, with preferential access for US American companies to the Venezuelan market.
The White House’s strategy for political change is not aimed at abruptly dismantling the Chavista model but rather at promoting a gradual reform from within the regime itself, with Delcy Rodríguez serving as the operational figure under Washington’s direct supervision.
As of June 2026, the political transition process has advanced through direct talks between representatives of the White House and Miraflores, centered on verifiable goals established by Washington and agreed upon with the interim government. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio has warned, failure to meet these commitments could bring economic and political consequences and even reopen the possibility of the use of force.
These bilateral negotiations have been notably opaque, taking place outside public scrutiny, with the Venezuelan people having little understanding of the scope of the commitments undertaken in their name by the interim government. Some of these agreements have resulted in legal reforms automatically approved by a National Assembly fully controlled by the ruling party and lacking both domestic and international legitimacy.
That dynamic has now changed with the formal incorporation of representatives of the 2015-elected National Assembly (AN 2015), led by its president Dinorah Figuera, as a third actor within the US strategy for political change in Venezuela. This shift raises questions about what prompted it and what its actual scope will be.
Questions the Bilateral Framework Could Not Answer
Although at the beginning of February this year the White House—including Trump and Rubio—gave some indications that the strategy for political change in Venezuela might include representatives of the democratic opposition, that intention never materialized, nor was any explanation offered for why it did not move forward. Instead, the bilateral framework between the White House and Miraflores remained in place.
In recent months, however, that strategy has generated criticism and pressure that the bilateral framework has been unable to answer satisfactorily, which may explain the Trump administration’s current shift. Among the main concerns are growing distrust within Venezuela over whether the process is genuinely leading toward a democratic transition or merely toward the normalization of a post-Maduro regime; demands from sectors of US politics for a clear roadmap toward elections in Venezuela; and the persistent legal uncertainty that continues to discourage American investors.
The first concern arises within Venezuela itself. While Trump has publicly expressed satisfaction with Delcy Rodríguez’s performance at the head of the interim government, criticism has grown inside the country regarding her legitimacy as acting president, since under the Constitution such an appointment is limited to a maximum of 180 days and expires on July 3. Delcy Rodríguez has no electoral mandate of her own. Her authority derives from the appointment of an illegitimate president and, ultimately, from US oversight.
This has been compounded by dissatisfaction with the results of her administration and widespread distrust in her ability to lead a democratic transition that has failed to meet Venezuelans’ expectations. This rejection has translated into growing social unrest, public demands for an end to the interim government, and calls for new elections.
The second concern comes from US domestic politics. During appearances before the US Congress, Rubio has had to respond to lawmakers demanding clearer deadlines, greater political opening, measurable progress, and a concrete electoral roadmap for Venezuela.
Those concerns were recently reinforced in a joint letter dated June 8 and signed by Senator Jeanne Shaheen and Representative Gregory W. Meeks, the ranking Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, respectively. In the letter, they demand a detailed explanation of US policy toward Venezuela as well as a specific strategy to ensure that political change in the country leads to a genuine democratic transition rather than simply preserving authoritarian rule.
The third concern comes from US American investors. For any company considering a long-term commitment to Venezuela, the fundamental question is: who has the legitimate authority to sign agreements on behalf of the Venezuelan state? Washington has attempted to answer that question administratively by lifting personal sanctions against Delcy Rodriguez, recognizing her as a Venezuelan authority in legal proceedings within the United States, allowing her to reestablish ties with Western banks, and facilitating Venezuela’s readmission to the IMF.
However, although these efforts have granted Rodriguez a degree of functional authority within the international system and reduced some immediate risks for investors, they have not eliminated the underlying doubts. Analysts warn that agreements signed by an interim government lacking democratic legitimacy, as well as legal reforms approved by a National Assembly whose legitimacy has been questioned even by the US government itself, could later be challenged by future Venezuelan administrations.
What Changes with the Inclusion of the 2015 National Assembly?
By formally incorporating representatives of the 2015 National Assembly into its political transition strategy, the White House is attempting to address one of the fundamental shortcomings of the previous bilateral framework: the absence of an institutional actor capable of legitimately representing the interests of the Venezuelan people.
Although it is still too early to assess the real impact of this shift—partly because the process remains opaque and the available information is quite general—it is possible, based on official statements from the parties involved, to identify several significant elements.
Those statements indicate that the parties have reached a preliminary agreement on a working format: a balanced political technical committee tasked with establishing an agenda containing specific milestones and timelines aimed at achieving a democratic transition (although the government communiqué refers to this objective more generally as “strengthening democracy”).
Regarding the specific issues to be discussed, the 2015 National Assembly sets out concrete priorities, including strengthening the National Electoral Council (CNE), restoring political parties, and guaranteeing equal conditions for all political actors. These priorities are also reflected in the US State Department’s statement. By contrast, the government’s statement is deliberately vague, avoiding any public commitment to specific objectives at this stage. One issue left unresolved by the official statements is whether the United States will participate directly in these discussions as a formal member of the technical committee or merely provide external support.
The inclusion of representatives from the 2015 National Assembly amounts to an implicit acknowledgment by Washington that the bilateral framework pursued until now was insufficient to provide democratic legitimacy to Venezuela’s political transition process.
With this redesign, an institutional space is created in which the demands and interests of Venezuelans can be represented in discussions over the country’s democratic roadmap. It also has the potential to reduce the opacity of the process and introduce an additional safeguard against the continuation of post-Maduro authoritarianism. Whether this shift will produce measurable progress toward free elections and a genuine transfer of power—or instead end up legitimizing a reformed authoritarian system under Washington’s supervision—remains to be seen.
