AA
Share
Seven weeks after the United States announced its supposed anti-drug operation in the Venezuelan Caribbean, a naval and air military deployment of 4,000 Marines remains in place, aimed at the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.
In an article published in El País, titled “The Venezuelan Dilemma: Negotiate Before the Bombs Decide,” Venezuelan journalist Boris Muñoz describes a country trapped in limbo. On the one hand, a full-scale military invasion is unlikely, but limited military actions to weaken the regime are considered imminent. On the other, no political negotiation seems possible between Maduro and Trump, while the opposition led by María Corina Machado remains aligned with the US strategy to secure recognition of Edmundo Gonzalez, the elected president and winner of the July 28, 2024 elections.
In a conversation on Esta Semana, broadcast on Confidencial’s YouTube channel due to television censorship in Nicaragua, Muñoz refuses to make predictions about a conflict unfolding in “the fog of war.”
In Venezuela, Muñoz summarizes, “one must take a considerable risk to bring about change. Otherwise, the alternative is the continued rule of the Maduro government, which has already caused enough havoc across the region. Latin America must look at itself and ask: what can we do to end this situation in the best possible way—producing regime change?”
After the sinking of three boats allegedly carrying Venezuelan drug traffickers in international waters, the United States has increased its military presence and even declared war on cartels it defines as “international non-state actors.” How does the Maduro regime interpret the continued and growing U.S. military pressure?
BORIS MUÑOZ: The regime is deeply concerned. It has tried to reopen unofficial talks through Rick Grenell, Trump’s special envoy for Venezuela. It has also taken steps to tighten internal control of drug trafficking to undercut the pretexts the Trump administration is using for this siege.
This began about seven weeks ago, with naval and now air deployments in Puerto Rico and Caribbean waters, involving more than 4,000 Marines and other forces. As Trump’s rhetoric has intensified, the Maduro government has made moves—even in Qatar—to explore possible dialogue or commitments that might save it from direct US military action on Venezuelan soil. I don’t mean an invasion, because there’s been clear emphasis in Washington that it wouldn’t be one. Rather, it would consist of strikes targeting drug-trafficking-related objectives.
But it’s all quite confusing, because this military buildup is being used to target the Maduro government directly. Maduro has been named head of the Cartel of the Suns and leader of El Tren de Aragua, and the bounty on his head has been raised to US $50 million. One doesn’t have to read between the lines to see that this points directly at Maduro—whether as deterrence or as a prelude to military action in the coming weeks, as several outlets have reported.
Maduro continues increasing militarization and preparing for supposed military confrontation. What is the mood among chavistas (government supporters) and ordinary Venezuelans? Are they preparing for a prolonged crisis or a quick strike?
People are expecting a surgical strike. I don’t have official data—just accounts from friends and family—describing an atmosphere of skepticism. The end of the Maduro regime has been announced so many times that people prefer to take everything “with a grain of salt.” In fact, there was a controversial New York Times report last Sunday that was heavily criticized for portraying the militias’ level of commitment, while hinting that there are internal problems within the Venezuelan government. The fact that the regime allowed a major outlet like the Times to conduct even a mild investigation shows a shift—an attempt to open a window to the outside world amid its deep isolation.
That’s a very significant fact. If you look at what’s happening in Latin America, there’s been very little noise, few voices speaking out against this imminent action. It’s been 35 years since we’ve seen such a major military deployment in Latin America — not since the 1989 invasion of Panama, which, incidentally, people tend to regard as a success.
Although this is officially an anti-drug operation, it’s becoming increasingly clear, and even the United States presents it that way, that it’s an operation against Maduro. Is it directed at Nicolás Maduro himself, or at the political–military leadership that sustains this regime? What impact is it having within that leadership? Have they become more united around Maduro, or could there be some cracks emerging? ?
I think it has created more unity. So far, we haven’t seen any cracks. But in reality, nothing significant has happened inside Venezuelan territory yet. The bombed boats were in international waters. Seventeen people are believed to have died, a tragic event, but there hasn’t been a direct attack on the regime. Everything remains, as experts say, within “the fog of war.”
It’s a relatively difficult picture to read, but if you look at what opposition spokespeople are saying, there’s a pretty close alignment between what María Corina Machado thinks and how the United States is acting. The expectation is that Maduro’s dictatorship will end in a few weeks — that’s what you hear on social media, that’s what Venezuelans in Florida believe. Some say they’ll carry out attacks like what happened with Osama bin Laden: an extraction or the elimination of Maduro’s inner circle. Others say there are 600 military targets, linked to drug trafficking, inside Venezuela. In that whole cloud of information, the clearest message is that actions will be taken to weaken Maduro’s regime, aiming to provoke an internal split — something people have talked about for years, but that still hasn’t happened.
I don’t know if that is going to happen. If US forces do engage, not through invasion or occupation, but through targeted strikes, it could indeed provoke a break and regime change. Venezuela simply lacks the military capacity to respond to US power.
That alignment of the Venezuelan opposition led by María Corina Machado, I suppose also including the elected president, Edmundo González, what implications does it have for their confrontation with the regime? The regime has threatened them even more. Could the opposition leaders who are still in Venezuela face further criminalization?
Without a doubt, there is a persecution underway, which adds to what was already happening. People have been arrested — I don’t know the exact number — but over the past month, activists from María Corina Machado’s party, Vente Venezuela, have been detained. There is a state of heightened surveillance and fear, carried out by Diosdado Cabello, who is in charge of repression. The situation is very complex for the opposition. For María Corina Machado, this is an extremely high-stakes gamble — almost a final attempt, but rather aimed at reaching the state of legitimacy that Edmundo González Urrutia was granted by last year’s (2024) election, which has not been recognized and was fraudulent on the part of the Venezuelan government. The goal is to reach the point where González Urrutia is recognized as the legitimate president of the Venezuelans and is sworn in as such.
think that’s the opposition’s goal at the moment. María Corina Machado said that her aim is not to be president, but to liberate Venezuela. She sees herself as the vector of this liberation, which she believes will be made possible through her alliance with the Trump administration — more specifically, with Marco Rubio.
In this intermediate space — where it’s not a full-scale military invasion, but there is a maximum increase in military pressure — it would be very likely for an escalation or confrontation to occur, military incidents between the armies of both countries. What kind of consequences could these military triggers have?
Internally, there is an effort at social control. By deploying militias and arming the population — even if he isn’t actually giving out the weapons, which isn’t entirely clear — the government is sending a signal to ensure that no one rises up at this moment and that there is no social revolt, which would be very costly and difficult to control. On the other hand, if a military incident of any kind does occur, I believe the outcome will be unfavorable for Venezuela, in the sense that the U.S. military deployment will have a higher cost in Venezuelan lives than for them.
Trump himself has built part of his political brand around avoiding military interventions that are costly in human lives. That’s what he has sold to the MAGA base. In a way, this represents a shift from what he has previously advocated, and politically, a low-cost regime change in Venezuela would be very profitable for him.
These are some of the elements that form part of a great haze — very difficult to unravel — about what’s coming. But there is an almost certain expectation among opposition actors that this will develop, and that only a few weeks remain.
In the event that this U.S. strategy of military pressure causes a disruption, a breakdown of the regime, and allows the Venezuelan opposition to assume leadership of the country — are they prepared for the day after? Edmundo González Urrutia would be the elected president and would take over the government, but can Venezuela actually be governed?
That’s an extremely difficult question. In Venezuela, there are illicit or criminal actors of various kinds. Colombian guerrillas have become narco-guerrillas, there are mineral traffickers, armed criminal gangs, and even the government’s own Colectivos. There are a lot of weapons scattered throughout Venezuela, and controlling them won’t be easy.
The opposition has a carefully prepared transition plan and control plan that would allow them to take over the government. It’s very risky to speculate on this and make a precise prediction. But, in any case — and this is a very personal opinion — a risk of considerable magnitude must be taken to bring about change. Otherwise, the alternative is the continuation of the Maduro government, which many present, both inside and outside Venezuela, as a factor of regional stability. We know that the Maduro regime is not a guarantee of greater stability; it has already caused enough havoc across the region. This is a moment when Latin America needs to look at itself and ask: what can we do to bring this situation to the best possible end, producing regime change? There should be action along those lines, which so far has not been seen either.
And on the other hand, the international actors allied with Maduro’s regime — I mean Iran, China, and Russia — don’t seem to be having much influence in this crisis. They make diplomatic statements, but I don’t think Maduro can really count on them.
I don’t think he can count on them. Maybe with Russia, up to a certain point, because Russia supplies weapons to Venezuela. The country’s major warplanes are Russian Sukhois, and its assault rifles are Kalashnikovs. But Russia is overstretched with its costly war in Ukraine. Iran was very recently defeated by the United States. China doesn’t like getting involved in military conflicts, and I don’t think its stake in Venezuela is high enough to justify any serious involvement there; it has far more profitable commercial alliances elsewhere, starting with Brazil.
It’s a very complex scenario for Maduro. They’re living off their image — the military power they’ve cultivated over the past 25 years — but I don’t think that’s enough for a prolonged confrontation, or perhaps even a brief one, with the world’s greatest military power.
The forecasts made by some Venezuelan leaders, and also by some North American politicians in Marco Rubio’s circle, that this crisis could be resolved before Christmas, do they have any basis in realism or feasibility?
I think that’s the central question, politically speaking, because next year (2026), there will be crucial midterm elections here in the United States for Trump’s project. If he gets caught in a prolonged military conflict, a quagmire of war, that would reduce his chances of winning that election.
On the other hand, there is a big bet that many Venezuelans will be eating hallacas in Caracas in December. I don’t know how realistic that hope is, or how close we are to being able to fulfill it, but they say that Trump has several intervention or action scenarios on his desk, and that any action must be low-cost and short-term. I, however, do not dare to make a forecast.
