25 de febrero 2025
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On February 21, 2025, General Julio César Avilés was sworn in by the co-dictators (officially called “co-presidents”) Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, for a fourth consecutive term as head of the Army. At the official event, the previous –and now retired– Nicaraguan military chiefs from between 1995 and 2010 were conspicuously absent.
The 1994 Nicaraguan Military Code established the military transition norm of a five-year term for Army chief. Between 1995 and 2010, the Generals Joaquín Cuadra, Javier Carrión and Omar Halleslevens each retired after their respective five-year terms as head of the Army. General Avilés’ was appointed Army chief in 2010. Breaking the Military Code norm, Ortega extended Avilés’ five-year appointment twice, and then on February 21, renewed his appointment for another six-year term (as established in the dictatorship's new dynastic succession plan). Avilés has more than 20 generals under him who have also been in their respective positions for more than ten years.
In the program Esta Semana, broadcast on CONFIDENCIAL's YouTube channel due to the censorship of the dictatorship, we spoke with two experts and researchers on civilian-military relations in the region to analyze the implications of General Avilés serving four consecutive terms as head of the Army, the political and economic alliance of the military leadership with the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship, and the institutional “plug” created by Avilés and his 20 generals that block the possibility of mobility and promotions of career Army officers.
Dr. Carlos Barrachina, a political scientist, sociologist, and researcher at the Mexican Army and Air Force University, and whose latest book is Security, Development and the Armed Forces: The Agenda between Mexico, the United States and Central America, says that the extension of Avilés’ term as head of the Army “has a major impact, because one of the unwritten rules of the armed forces generally is to specify terms so that there is mobility for the proper functioning of the institution. When there is a consolidation of leadership, the institution suffers, and what wins out are issues of loyalty, in which there is a kind of pact between the elites of the armed forces and the political leadership, and they are part of the same thing.”
Javier Meléndez, a defense and security analyst, founder and former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Public Policy of Nicaragua (IEEPP) and now director of Expediente Abierto (Open File), remarked that the relationship between the military leadership and the Ortega regime began as “a political pact” in which the Army also had the green light to develop its own businesses without getting involved in politics. “At this point it's more a matter of survival for each of them. Clearly, Ortega depends on the Army to stay in power and the institution is so compromised in terms of human rights violations, corruption, and economic and business operations that they are in a situation in which they now can't undo what they have worked to tie together during all these years.”
The “plug” put in by Avilés and the 20 generals
What is the significance of this fourth consecutive term of General Avilés as head of the Nicaraguan Army, with the current term being for another six years after 15 years in the post? Does this model of an Army, with a practically permanent chief, have any parallel in the armed forces of Latin America?
Javier Meléndez: This is a totally unprecedented scenario for Latin America. There have been periods in which Army chiefs have remained in command of the institutions for many years, but usually that was tied to the fact that they were [themselves] military dictators. But in this case, an Army chief who is about to begin six more years in office, which would take him to 21 years as head of the institution – I don't think there is a similar case in Latin America.
In Venezuela, [Vladimir] Padrino López has been around for 11 years as head of the Armed Forces, but it's a different dynamic. He has political and administrative command, but the management of the Venezuelan Army –the operational, strategic, intelligence and logistics management– is run by a group of nine generals, major generals and admirals, who make the institution function. The Nicaraguan case has no comparison in Latin America.
This has not not always been the case in Nicaragua. In 1994, when the Military Code was approved, a period of five years was established for the position of head of the Army, which was rigorously complied with by Generals Joaquín Cuadra, Javier Carrión and Omar Halleslevens. They each finished their terms and went into retirement. How did this break with the military succession norm come about with General Avilés? Was it an imposition by Daniel Ortega or a demand by Avilés and the Army?
Javier Meléndez: When Daniel Ortega assumed power, General Omar Halleslevens was head of the Army. I believe that in the Bolaños-Ortega transition, Halleslevens tried to maintain, to the extent possible, the stability of the Army in the terms that his predecessors had done. But when Ortega came in, there was clearly a demand for subordination, a mandate by Ortega that the Army should go back to being a Sandinista army, and at that time, General Halleslevens did absolutely nothing to prevent that from happening.
I see it as an issue that combines Ortega's desire to [break the norm] with the attitude of the Army to comply with [his desire]. A political pact in which old ex-Sandinista generals wanted to retake the revolutionary ideology of the 80's, which later ended up having political consequences for the institution. But at this point it's more a matter of survival for each of them. Clearly, Ortega depends on the Army to stay in power and the institution is so compromised in terms of human rights violations, corruption, and business economic operations that they are in a situation in which they now can't undo what they have worked to tie together during all these years.
What does it mean for the Army as an institution that there is not only a chief who's been in power now for 15 years and maybe another six years, but also a leadership of 20 generals who have more than ten or fourteen years in their positions and represent a sort of “institutional plug.” How does this impact the military in terms of career officers?
Carlos Barrachina: It has a major impact, because one of the unwritten rules of the armed forces generally is to specify terms so that there is mobility for the proper functioning of the institution.
When there is a consolidation of leadership, the institution suffers, and what wins out are issues of loyalty, in which there is a kind of pact between the elites of the armed forces and the political leadership, and they are part of the same thing. It's a bit like what is happening in Venezuela and what has happened in Cuba as well, so for the Nicaraguan Armed Forces, it is definitely a big problem.
In the case of Honduras, Romeo Vázquez Velázquez, the alleged coup leader, had been reappointed by President [Mel] Zelaya and had served a couple of terms.
This is unthinkable in many countries where the institution is really consolidated. In the case of Mexico, for example, it would be unthinkable to visualize a general staying longer than a six-year term, because there is indeed mobility, steps in the careers of all the others, and there is a consolidated institution. What this [the extended period of Avilés] shows are personal loyalties and a project between the great elites of the armed forces with the political leadership.
A political alliance
It's a political alliance, but is it an alliance with General Avilés, or with the Army leadership, or with the Army as an institution? Are these officers, majors, colonels, even some generals who are in the Army, who are making a career and who have gotten to where they are because of the “plug” and because of the permanence of Avilés in the Army – are they part of this alliance?
Javier Meléndez: What is publicly known is that the commanders of the Nicaraguan Army are on the side of General Avilés and are backing the regime. There are rumors of some internal dissent in the Army, but publicly the alliance is consolidated. General Avilés and the commanders have committed the institution to complete subordination under the Ortega-Murillo family, and I don't see that this can be modified in the short term, until a natural or unnatural event occurs that results in the disappearance of Daniel Ortega.
Then there is the debate as to how far these Army commanders would maintain their loyalty to Daniel Ortega's wife and children. This is something that Nicaraguan analysts consider a very unstable scenario and would open the possibility of a crisis between the Army and the regime.
Internally, it's difficult to know the level of discontent within the armed forces. There's an institutional wear and tear that has been caused by this almost lifelong permanence of the Army commanders who are in charge of the institution. An officer aspires to be promoted, he studies to become an officer and sees that he can become a commander of the institution. This does not happen in the Nicaraguan Army and it is not going to happen in the short term. This should be a reason for discontent within the Army and with the officers, but we do not know to what extent these other officers are captive in terms of corruption and clientelism. It is known, for example, that there are many [military] officers who are assigned to work in institutions other than the Army –civilian institutions–, and that generates much more loyalty to the regime.
Carlos Barrachina: Military institutions are hierarchical, which means that as long as the command is established, those below remain subordinate, no matter how many problems, debates, and internal discussions may arise in other echelons of the institution.
In Cuba, the transition has already taken place from the Castro family to the new Cuban authorities. In Venezuela, a similar transition from Chávez to Maduro has also occurred, yet the institution remains intact. While there have been small changes in the military leadership and some political positions, the institution itself has persisted. This perspective is essential for understanding the relationship between the armed forces, their command structure, and the country’s institutional framework.
Thinking, for example, about a future transition process, we need to look at how the armed forces are treated. A political process in which the institution is condemned and treated in a one-sided way– assuming it sided completely with the regime – practically guarantees that the regime will sustain itself by replacing key figures, as there will be no incentives for change.
This happened in some Latin American countries, whereas in contrast, in the case of Spain, the armed forces opened space for the possibility of political change with the Spanish transition in the 80s.
But in the event of a national crisis provoked by the repression or by an internal rupture of the regime, is there any institutional reserve in the Army that could play some stabilizing role, or some role in that possible transition?
Javier Meléndez: Unfortunately, within the dictatorships we currently have in Latin America, there have been no movements within the armed forces that have led to a situation in which the dictatorships feel in danger because of the lack of loyalty of their armies. At this moment, there is solid loyalty of the [Nicaraguan] Army to the regime and I don't see that they have incentives to go the other direction. And this is because the international community has been unclear about what is expected of the Army.
For example, the United States is always reluctant to pressure armies to make regime change, because they expect armies to play key roles in transitions and they expect armies at some point to be a platform or a trigger for change. That has not happened in Latin America. In Nicaragua there were people who thought that the Army was going to turn against the regime and that is why they said not to sanction it and not to touch it, because it won't have incentives to go to the side of the opposition. That didn't happen, it's not going to happen, and now we're in a situation in which I believe it's unthinkable that this will happen as long as there are no actions on the part of the international community to make the Army mid-level commanders rethink that the country needs to go another direction.
The Paramilitary Army
The key moment in the relationship between the Army and the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship occurred during the 2018 crisis, when a nationwide protest nearly brought the regime to its knees. In response, Ortega decided to organize a parallel army—a paramilitary force operating outside the law. Nicaraguan law states that there can only be one armed body: the National Army. At that moment, not only did the Nicaraguan Army remain silent, but it also collaborated in the repression. Some argue that it did so actively, while others say it provided intelligence and information for the "clean-up operation" carried out by this paramilitary force—one that is now even legalized under the new Constitution. But how can these two armed bodies coexist?
Carlos Barrachina. How can they coexist? Well, they just do. It deeply saddens me to see what has happened in Nicaragua in recent years. I feel immense sadness for what Nicaraguans like you, your friends, and society as a whole have had to endure—it's devastating.
Dictators almost always have paramilitary forces to do their dirty work. The Armed Forces, seeking to maintain the appearance of institutional legitimacy and preserve their ability to engage with other militaries around the world—while also avoiding potential human rights lawsuits in international criminal courts—find it convenient to rely on these paramilitary groups for repression.
One common factor among the military elites of Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and some other countries is their connection to drug trafficking, which is also bringing the entire region to its knees. The U.S. has sanctioned and penalized them for this, yet very few people truly understand what is happening in Nicaragua regarding organized crime. For instance, charter flights from Africa and Asia are arriving in Managua, carrying people looking to migrate to the United States via Mexico. This suggests that organized crime is heavily involved in these migration routes, as it is criminal networks that are facilitating their journey north.
Given this broader regional crisis, I am not at all surprised that Nicaragua has a paramilitary force to handle the regime’s dirty work. However, the elites within the military apparatus will not emerge unscathed from the highly complex situation that is unfolding—and will continue to unfold—throughout the region.
Javier Meléndez. Legal reforms were obviously made in Nicaragua to legitimize paramilitarism—something that had not happened before and can only be compared to the situation in Venezuela. This has undoubtedly undermined the legitimacy of the Army, as the public sees its inaction in the face of paramilitary violence. In the historical memory, the Army will be remembered as a complicit force in these events, further implicating it in human rights violations.
Finally, there is also an internal morale crisis and the potential for institutional fractures. Not all Army officers agree with the existence of these paramilitary groups, which strip the Police and the Army of their constitutional monopoly over the use of force and weapons.
Corruption and private business
There are economic interests linking the military and the government. On one hand, companies owned by the Military Social Security Institute operate with advantages in their dealings with the state. On the other, former military officials hold key public positions. But there are also active-duty military personnel engaged in a range of private businesses—large cattle and rice farms, forestry operations. How does this economic alliance work?
Javier Meléndez. The military’s business activities have existed for a long time; they didn’t emerge spontaneously when Daniel Ortega came to power. From the beginning, the Nicaraguan military used assets and materials it had in the 1980s as seed capital, which was distributed among military leadership, Ortega, his allies, and the military itself. From there, an unregulated system developed: a laissez-faire approach where they were free to do whatever they wanted economically, as long as they stayed out of politics.
Between 1990 and 2007, this understanding prevailed—don’t touch the military, don’t interfere with its business, just let it operate freely, as long as it stays out of politics.
EThe problem is that they operated with too much autonomy. No one dared to question the military’s growing business ventures, no limits were imposed, and then when Ortega came back to power, he found an environment of economic prosperity fueled by Venezuelan aid. The military’s business dealings were thriving and only grew further. Now, we find ourselves in a scenario where they are not just military leaders—they are oligarchs and businessmen.
It’s no longer just the top brass running businesses; now, mid-level officers are involved as well, penetrating different levels of the public sector. It’s worth highlighting the recent work by Nicaragua Investiga and Café con Vos on how these business practices are evolving. They are directly controlling state contracts and concessions, either through military-owned companies or businesses linked to high-ranking officers.
This is the reality, and dismantling this web of businesses will be a major challenge in any future transition. These business interests reinforce the corrupt bond between the regime, the ruling family, and the military. Unfortunately, it’s a disastrous scenario for institutional governance.
The Army Between Trump, Putin, and Organized Crime
Let’s talk about the implications of Nicaragua’s military alignment with Russia in Central America, as well as its impact on relations with the U.S. If Trump and Putin were to strike a deal over Ukraine that favors Russia, could this have consequences in Central America—specifically in Nicaragua—as a reaction from the U.S.?
Carlos Barrachina. This is a complex issue, and it won’t be decided in the coming weeks, even though Trump tends to make quick decisions. What matters to Trump in the region? Migration and drug trafficking.
If Putin doesn’t make much noise in Central America, there won’t be an issue, because for the U.S., the real threats are drug trafficking and migration. A key factor will be whether the influx of African and Asian migrants passing through Nicaragua solidifies. Over the past two years, Mexico’s National Institute of Migration has detained 50,000 African and 50,000 Asian migrants annually. If these numbers keep rising and migrants are crossing Nicaragua by land to head north, then the U.S. will take notice.
Otherwise, Trump’s main interest in Ukraine is to stop spending money on a war that he doesn’t see as serving vital U.S. interests—unless the Ukrainians hand over the minerals and companies he wants to develop in their region. As long as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua don’t cause problems, the U.S. won’t be concerned. The real political drivers for Trump are drug trafficking and migration, because those issues resonate with the Republican electorate in the southern U.S.
We’re no longer in the Cold War, even though some countries still operate as if they are. Some nations continue to uphold old Cold War alliances, but Trump is guided by his own interests.
Javier Meléndez. I don’t believe Russia has ever posed a direct security threat to the U.S. through its military cooperation with Nicaragua. The real issue—until recently—was Russia’s support for authoritarian regimes in Central America, such as in Nicaragua and Honduras, under Mel Zelaya and Xiomara Castro. Last year, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov even said Russia saw Honduras as a strategic partner.
But Russia’s influence in the region has more to do with disinformation and manipulation—undermining liberal democracies, discrediting transparent elections, and attacking the right to a free press and freedom of association. That’s what has worried the U.S. the most about Russia’s presence in Central America. And without a doubt, there has been even greater concern over China’s growing influence.
In the U.S., Trump’s closeness to Putin is widely unpopular—nearly 80% of respondents in the latest polls disapprove of it. What’s certain is that under Trump, Russia will become less of a U.S. concern, while worries over China’s influence and presence in the region will persist.
Carlos Barrachina. Don’t forget about Mexico either—Mexico is now the most violent country in the world. In many cities with over 500,000 residents, homicide rates exceed 100 per 100,000 people. In smaller cities, rates can even reach 200 per 100,000, as seen in Tulum, which is part of Quintana Roo’s tourist zone.
The threats from El Mayo Zambada (a drug lord imprisoned in New York) are particularly troubling due to the close ties between the political class and organized crime. Mexico is on Trump’s radar, and he seems ready to focus on the region. The expansion of organized crime across Central America has direct implications for what might happen in Nicaragua and throughout the entire region.
This article was originally published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated by our staff. To get the most relevant news from our English coverage delivered straight to your inbox, subscribe to The Dispatch.
